This paper studies attack-resilient estimation of a class of switched nonlinear systems subject to stochastic noises. The systems are threatened by both of signal attacks and switching attacks. The problem is formulated as the joint estimation of states, attack vectors and modes of hidden-mode switched systems. We propose an estimation algorithm which is composed of a bank of state and attack vector estimators and a mode estimator. The mode estimator selects the most likely mode based on modes' posterior probabilities induced by the discrepancies between obtained outputs and predicted outputs. We formally analyze the stability of estimation errors in probability for the proposed estimator associated with the true mode when the hidden mode is time-invariant but remains unknown. For hidden-mode switched linear systems, we discuss a way to reduce computational complexity which originates from unknown signal attack locations. Lastly, we present numerical simulations on the IEEE 68-bus test system to show the estimator performance for time-varying modes with a regular mode set and a reduced mode set.
Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are systems which integrate control systems with advanced technologies of sensing, computation and communication. The integration leads to highly automated and collaborative applications such as autonomous vehicles, remote patient monitoring, and smart grid. Due to such potentials, the significance on CPS is emphasized by the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology at 2010 [13] .
Security is of vital importance for CPS. Especially, because of the couplings between the cyber layer and physical layer, CPS bear vulnerabilities to cyberattacks which may cause irreparable damage to the physical layer [4] . For example, a natural gas flow control system in Russia was temporarily seized in 2000 and a sewage control system in Australia was attacked in the same year [33] . According to early studies on CPS security, the types of possible attacks on CPS can be categorized into sig-nal attacks and switching attacks. Signal attacks include sensor attacks which tamper with sensor readings and actuator attacks which tamper with control commands. While signal attacks modify the magnitudes or timings [42, 43] of signals, switching attacks alter system structures [36, 39] . The attacks can be launched via communication jamming and malware; e.g., Trojan.
Literature review. One topic in CPS security focuses on identifying fundamental limitations on the detectability of attacks. Paper [25] investigates the possibilities that attacks can bypass detection algorithms for power systems. Undetectable attack spaces on linear systems are characterized in [30] . A number of attack detectors against signal attacks are designed. In particular, attack detection problems for deterministic linear systems are formalized into 0 / ∞ optimization problems [7, 30] . Due to non-convexity, the problems are NP-hard [30] . To address the computational challenges, paper [7] proposes convex relaxations of the optimization problems. It is analyzed in [28] that a state estimator based on 0 optimization is robust with respect to modeling errors caused by sampling, computation/actuation jitter, and synchronization. Paper [26] uses the Kalman filter to conduct attack-resilient state estimation in the presence of stochastic noises. Paper [32] proposes a multi-modal Luenberger observer whose memory usage increases linearly with the number of states and outputs. Papers [25, 26, 28, 32] consider sensor attacks, and papers [7, 30] consider both sensor and actuator attacks. Paper [39] designs an attack-resilient estimator for stochastic linear systems in the presence of sensor attacks, actuator attacks, and switching attacks. All aforementioned papers focus on linear systems.
Our attack-resilient estimator design method is based on simultaneous unknown Input and State Estimation (ISE). Early research of this area focuses on state estimation without estimating unknown inputs [5, 14] . Unbiased and minimum variance unknown input and state estimators are designed for linear systems without direct feedthrough matrix [15] and with full-column rank direct feedthrough matrix [9, 38] , and with rank-deficient direct feedthrough matrix [40] . Noticeably, this set of papers is restricted to linear systems.
Contributions. In this paper, we consider a class of switched nonlinear stochastic systems under signal attacks and switching attacks. We formulate the attack-resilient estimation problem as the simultaneous estimation of states, attack vectors and hidden modes. The proposed algorithm associates an estimator to each mode and the estimators share the same structure. Each estimator recursively produces the estimates of states and attack vectors. The mode estimator selects the most likely mode based on modes' posteriori probabilities found by the discrepancies between obtained outputs and predicted outputs. For the special case where the hidden mode is fixed but remains unknown, it is shown that the estimation errors of states and attack vectors of the true mode satisfy Practically Exponentially Stable in probability (PESp) like properties. In addition, we discuss a way to reduce computational complexity by reducing the number of modes for switched linear stochastic systems, which maintains the minimal number of modes to achieve the same detection capabilities as the power set. On the IEEE 68-bus test system, numerical simulations are conducted to show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm on time-varying modes with a regular mode set and a reduced mode set. Towards our best knowledge, this is the first time to systematically study unknown input, state, and mode estimation of switched nonlinear stochastic systems.
This paper is enriched from preliminary version [18] and includes a set of new results. In particular, this paper discusses how to reduce computational complexity caused by unknown signal attack locations. An additional numerical simulation is conduct to show the estimator performance for reduced mode sets. Lastly, this paper contains all the proofs which were omitted in [18] .
Paper organization. A motivating example of CPS model and attack model is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 introduces system model, attack model and defender's knowledge. Moreover, the state, attack vector, and mode estimation problem is formulated in the same section. We propose Nonlinear unknown Input, State and Mode Estimator (NISME) to solve the estimation problem in Section 4. The stability of the proposed estimator is formally analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 discusses a way to reduce computational complexity caused by unknown signal attack locations, for switched stochastic linear systems. Section 7 offers numerical simulations on the IEEE 68-bus test system to show the performance of the proposed NISME with a regular mode set and a reduced mode set. We present the derivations and proofs of the proposed estimator in Section 8.
Notations. Given a vector a k , we useâ k andã k to denote an estimate of a k and induced estimation error a k = a k −â k , respectively. Its error covariance is defined by
, and cross error covariance with
We use the following definition for filter stability of nonlinear systems.
Definition 1.1 Stochastic process x(t) is said to be Practically Exponentially Stable in probability (PESp) if for any γ ∈ (0, 1), there exist positive constants α, b, c, and δ such that, for any x(0) ≤ δ, the following holds for all t ≥ 0:
The dynamic of bus i with attacks is described as the following switched nonlinear system:
with the output model
adopted from Chapter 9 in [37] adding a phase angle measurement as [6, 31] . System states θ i (t), f i (t) are phase angle and angular frequency, respectively. Mode index j il (t) ∈ {0, 1} represents on/off of the power line connection between buses i and l; i.e., power flow is
, and P 0 il (t) = −P 0 li (t) = 0. The values P Li (t), and P eleci (t) = P Li (t) + D i f i (t) denote power demand, and electrical power output, respectively. Since power demand P Li (t) can be obtained by many load forecasting methods [1, 11] , it is assumed to be known.
Mechanical power P Mi (t) is the control input for i ∈ G and is assumed to be zero at load bus i ∈ L. Power demand can be divided into elastic demand P E Li (t) and inelastic demand P IE Li (t) as shown in [2] ; i.e., P Li (t) = P E Li (t)+P IE Li (t). Elastic demand P E Li (t) can be controlled via power pricing. Since we assume that the current load is known, we simplify that load bus i ∈ L uses P Li (t) as load controller.
The measurements are sampled at discrete instants due to hardware constraints. We use subscript k ∈ Z ≥0 to denote an instantaneous value at the discrete sampling time t k ; e.g.,
An attacker is assumed to be able to modify the sensor measurements, control commands, and trigger the power flow line switches. The possible attacks are modeled as vectors d s,i,k ∈ R, d a,i (t) ∈ R, and hidden mode switch j il (t) which represent sensor attacks [26, 30] , actuator attacks [7, 30, 43] , and circuit breaking/switching attacks [36, 39] , respectively.
Problem formulation
System model. Consider the hidden-mode nonlinear stochastic systeṁ
where x(t) ∈ R n , y k ∈ R m , u(t) ∈ R s , and j(t) ∈ M I are state, output, input, and hidden-mode, respectively. We use subscript k ∈ Z ≥0 to denote an instantaneous value at the discrete sampling time t k . Vectors d a (t) ∈ R s , and d s,k ∈ R m are actuator attack vector and sensor attack vector, respectively. Sets C j(t) , D j(t) ⊆ R n denote flow set and jump set, respectively, and Ω is a mode transition function. For each mode, process noise w (t) ∈ R s1 and measurement noise v k ∈ R s2 are uncorrelated with each other. The system is a continuous-discrete system because, while the physical dynamic evolves in continuous time, sensor measurements are obtained at their corresponding sampling instants due to hardware constraints. We define a uniform sampling period as = t k − t k−1 . It is assumed that the system (3) has a unique solution. One of the sufficient condition for the unique solution is weak one-sided local Lipschitz condition on function f (·) in the open time interval of each mode duration [35] and other conditions can be found in the references therein. The system model (3) includes the power system model (1) with (2) as a special case.
Attack model. Signal attacks are comprised of signal magnitude attacks (i.e., the attacker injects attack signals), and signal location attacks (i.e., the attacker chooses targeted sensors/actuators). Signal attacks are modeled by d a (t) and d s,k where zero values indicate that the corresponding actuators and sensors are free of attacks and non-zero values represent attack magnitudes. Switching attacks change system modes following Ω .
Knowledge of the defender. The defender is unaware of which actuators/sensors are under attacks and what the current mode is. The defender knows dynamic system model and output model (4) for each mode but not the mode transition function Ω . Mode set M I is also known to the defender. The attack vectors d a (t), d s,k , mode j(t) and its transitions are inaccessible to the defender. Noise vectors w (t), v k are unknown but their auto covariance matrices are known.
Objective. The defender aims to answer the following three questions: (a) if any sensor or actuator is attacked; (b) if so, which ones are attacked, and how much sensor readings and control commands are tampered with; (c) what current system states are. The above problem can be formulated as a joint estimation of states, attack vectors and modes of hidden-mode switched systems (3).
Estimator design
In order to reflect real world, system (3) models the attacks from the attacker's point of view and captures attack sources. In order to solve the estimation problem, we need to model the attacks from the defender's point of view and captures attack consequences. In particular, we rewrite system (3) as follows:
where
. The defender models the signal location attacks as mode j(t) of diagonal matrix
where K j (i, i) = 1 if mode j assumes that the i th location is under attack; otherwise,
A × M I stands for the both signal location attacks M A and switching attacks M I .
Remark 4.1 For the sake of generality, we will consider arbitrary K j ∈ R (s+m)×(s+m) in the remaining of this section and Sections 5.
To solve the problem, we propose Nonlinear unknown Input, State and Mode Estimator (NISME). The NISME consists of a bank of Nonlinear unknown Input and State estimators (NISE) and a mode estimator as shown in Figure 1 . Each NISE is associated with a particular mode Fig. 1 . Scheme of NISME and recursively estimates the states and attack vectors under the fixed mode. The mode estimator calculates the posteriori probabilities of the modes by observing output discrepancies from predicted outputs, and chooses the most likely one. Lastly, the NISME outputs the estimates of the states and the attack vectors of the selected mode.
We first introduce some preliminaries for the NISE in Section 4.1. The NISME is presented in Section 4.2.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce an output decomposition used in the NISE. Since each NISE is associated with a particular mode, we omit the mode index j(t) for notational simplicity.
We first discretize and linearize system (4) as follows with constant sampling period :
refers to discretization error, and
We define the autocovariance matrices for noise vectors as E[w k w
Now we introduce two coordinate transformations. The first one is based on the singular value decomposition
where Σ is a full rank diagonal matrix. The first coordinate transformation T k is defined by
Likewise, the singular value decomposition
with full-rank diagonal matrixΣ k induces the second
From coordinate transformations (6) and (7), the output y k in (5) can be decom-posed as follows:
where 
Output z 1,k is the portion of y k which is attacked at k; i.e., z 1,k includes d 1,k in (8) . Outputs z 2,k and z 3,k are the portions of y k and are free of attacks at k, where output z 2,k reflects d 2,k indirectly be- (8) is instead used to estimate d 2,k−1 ; i.e., matrices C 2,k and G 2,k−1 must be known to estimate attack vector d 2,k−1 . However, in (5), matrix G 2,k−1 is obtained by linearizing f (·) usingd 2,k−1 , and matrix C k is obtained by linearizing h(·) usingx k|k−1 , where these linearizations cannot be done without knowingd 2,k−1 . Thus, we have the following assumption. Assumption 4.1 Dynamic system model (4) can be expressed aṡ
With Assumption 4.1, the dynamic system (5) becomes
where matrices A k , B k , G 1,k , and J k can be obtained before having an estimate for d 2,k . Output equation (9) is linearized into (8) where noises
are uncorrelated with each other and is found in line 5 and the matrices in line 5 are defined byQ
Algorithm statement
We correct the predicted state using the measurement bias (line 7) between the measured output and the predicted output. Error covariance matrix P . For this purpose, the discrepancy between the measured output z j 3,k and the predicted output is used to validate the mode (line 13) because they should match if j is the true mode. Since the system is nonlinear, the discrepancy ν j k may not be
with initial conditionx
The priori probability of the mode 13: 
Gaussian. We approximate ν j k as a Gaussian random vector because it is a typical practice to approximate an unknown noise as a Gaussian distribution as [21] . Moreover, ν j k is Gaussian when the system is linear and noises w Now consider the NISME (Algorithm 2) which is derived in Section 8.2. The NISME runs the NISE for each mode j ∈ M in parallel to generate the state and attack vector estimates along with the priori probability for each Algorithm 2 NISME Input:
Read sensor output y k , and control input u(t) for t ∈ [t k−1 , t k ];
3:
Run the NISE with input (j,x
end for Mode estimator 6: for j ∈ M do
end for 9: for j ∈ M do 10:
end for 12:
19: end for mode (line 4). After then, the algorithm identifies the most likely mode (lines [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . By the Bayes' theorem, the posteriori probability µ j k is updated by a linear combination of the priori probabilities (line 7). It is not desirable that some mode probabilities vanish over time because the true modes might be time-varying. A lower bound δ is adopted in line 7 to prevent the vanishment of the mode probabilities. After the lower bound is applied, the mode probability is normalized in line 10. The mode with the largest posteriori probability µ j k is cho-sen as a current mode (line 12), and the attack vectors of the current mode are tested by Chi-square hypothesis tests (p.354 in [29] ) with significance levels α 1 , α 2 to determine whether they are statistically significant or not (line 14). Specifically, we have the following nullhypothesis and alternative hypothesis
Chi-square value is presented as χ 2 df (α) where df and α are the degree of freedom and significance level, respectively. If it is not statistically significant, the algorithm chooses the signal attack-free mode as a current mode. The corresponding state and attack vector estimates are returned (line 18). Due to limited measurements over the continuous-time dynamic system model, we use the approximation that the attack vector estimates are constants during a sampling period, in lines 2,4,10 of the NISE, and lines 18 of the NISME. We, however, will consider approximation errors in the analysis.
Analysis
In this section, we analyze that the state and attack vector estimation errors of the proposed estimator satisfy PESp-like properties. The properties in this section are guaranteed for the true mode when the hidden mode is fixed but remains unknown.
Recall that we use the approximation that the attack vector estimates are constants during a sampling period. In addition, we assume that the attack vectors are continuous in a sampling period, and their gradients are uniformly bounded. 
Some required notations are introduced below. It is obvious that w k shown in (10) is uncorrelated with v 1,k , v 2,k , or v 3,k . Noise vectors v 1,k , v 2,k , and v 3,k are also uncorrelated with each others because
T 2,k = 0. We introduce the linearization errors φ k , ψ 1,k , ψ 2,k , and ψ 3,k for the stability analysis:
where φ k is a function ofd 1,k andd 1,k is a function of x k|k and v k . We omit the arguments of the linearization errors in the rest of the paper. The linearization errors can not be used to estimate the states and attack vectors, since they include unknown variables x k , w k , and v k .
Now consider the following assumptions.
Assumption 5.2 There exist positive constantsā ,c 3 , q , and r 3 such that the following holds for ∀k:
If Rank(Σ) = 0, there exist positive constantsc 1 ,ḡ 1 , and m 1 such that the following holds for ∀k:
If Rank(Σ k ) = 0, there exist positive constantsc 2 , g 2 , g 2 , m 2 ,m 2 , and r 2 such that the following holds for ∀k:
Assumption 5.4 There exist positive constants p and p such that pI ≤ P x k ≤pI for ∀k.
Under the assumptions, we can guarantee PESp-like properties for the estimation errors of states and attack vectors. 3 , and¯ such that, if Q k ≤q I, R 1,k ≤r 1 I, R 2,k ≤r 2 I, R 3,k ≤r 3 I, and ≤¯ , then the following properties hold:
for all x 0|0 ≤ δ, k ≥ 0 and t ≥ 0. A includes all the combinations of the attack locations; i.e., |M A | = 2 s+m . As the number of signal attack location increases, computational complexity increases exponentially. We, in this section, discuss how to alleviate computational complexity by reducing the number of modes induced by M A , and how to estimate the true mode from the estimation results of a reduced mode set for hidden-mode switched linear systems. Finding a reduced mode set presented in Section 6.1, and finding a true mode presented in Section 6.2 are both online procedures. The former is conducted before running the NISE, and the latter will replace the hypothesis test (line [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] in the NISME. The complete algorithm for the NISME with reduced mode set is presented in Section 6.2, where we consider the special case with |M I | = 1. In Section 6.3, we extend the results to any M I .
Let us consider the special case where the dynamic for each mode j is linear and switching, and |M I | = 1:
where S j(t) , and H j k are defined in (4). We remind
Mode reduction
Mode reduction is based on the following two ideas. Firstly, we maintain the modes such that uniform observability over finite time-horizon [c 1 , c 2 ] (Definition 6.1) holds. Secondly, we remove modes whose assumptions on attack locations are strictly restrictive than those of others. 
The first idea is motivated by the sufficient condition for Lemma 5.1; uniform observability. To check uniform observability, the defender is required to have information on pairs (C j 3,k ,Ā j k ) for k = 0, 1, · · · . This information is hard to gather at initial time. We instead adopt an approximation, Definition 6.1, which only requires the system matrices for a few next steps. Uniform observability over [c 1 , c 2 ] reduces to uniform observability as c 2 → ∞ with fixed c 1 .
To justify the second idea, consider a pair of modes j, j ∈
indicates that mode j imposes a more restrictive assumption on attack locations than mode j. In this sense, mode j is said to be redundant and it could be ruled out to reduce computational complexity.
Intuitively speaking, the above ideas allow the minimal number of modes to provide the same attack capability as the power set. The reduced mode set is defined by 
Algorithm 3 Mode reduction (finding
Remark 6.1 Mode reduction Algorithm 3 is not applicable to nonlinear systems because uniform observability is determined by where linearization is performed. This information cannot be obtained in advance.
True mode estimation
We discuss how to estimate the true mode from the outputs of the NISME under the reduced mode set. It might be noticed that the reduced mode set might not include true modes, since some of the modes are removed. Given mode estimateĵ(t) from the reduced mode set M d [c1,c2] , the idea is to conduct two-tailed z-test [29] for each attack location i ∈ Kĵ (t) 1 to determine whether the attack size is statistically significant. To be specific, we test the null hypothesis that i th elements of d 1,k or d 2,k−1 are zero: 
i.e., there exists an attack on i th location. Algorithm 4 presents the pseudo code for true mode estimation. zvalue is presented as z(α) where α is the significance level. Hypothesis tests are conducted in lines 6 and 13 for actuator attacks, and sensor attacks, respectively.
NISME with reduced mode set
Algorithm 5 shows the NISME with reduced mode sets. The core of the algorithm is identical to that of the NISME, and some differences are explained as follows.
We apply the mode reduction technique and true mode estimation technique to each i ∈ M I . The algorithm calculates reduced mode set every T steps for every i ∈ M I (line 4). This requires the defender to have knowledge on system matices for next T − 1 steps. Based on the fact that the reduced mode set might not include the true mode, we test attack vectors element-wise to identify the true mode (line 19). As T decreases in Algorithm 5, lesser knowledge on system matrices is required, but computational complexity induced by Algorithm 3 increases. When system (13) is time-invariant, T = ∞. 
Algorithm 4 Mode estimation with mode reduction
Input:ĵ k ,dĵ k 1,k ,dĵ k 2,k−1 , P d1,ĵ k k , P d2,ĵ k k−1 , α 1 , α 2 (signifiif i ≤ s then 6: if |dĵ k 2,k−1 (l2)| P d 2 ,ĵ k k−1 (l2,l2) > z(α 2 ) then 7: Kĵ true k (i, i) = 1,dĵ true k 2,k−1 (l 2 ) =dĵ k 2,k−1 (l 2 );
Numerical simulation
In Section 5, a set of properties is shown for the true mode under the time-invariant hidden mode. However, we do not have formal guarantees for the cases of timevarying modes. Moreover, the effectiveness of a set of reduced modes discussed in Section 6 remains unclear. In this section, we will use the IEEE 68-bus test system to empirically illustrate them. The NISME is applied to the IEEE 68-bus test system shown in Figure 3 . In the network, there are 16 generator buses (|G| = 16), and 52 load buses (|L| = 52). Each local bus is described by (1) (as [16] ), and (2) with = 0.01s. It is assumed that noises Algorithm 5 NISME with reduced mode set
, u 0 , 0, j, 0)) for ∀j ∈ M; Choose 0 < δ 1 |M| , 0 < α 1 < 1, 0 < α 2 < 1 (significance levels), and T ; 1: for q = 0 : N do 2:
Run Algorithm 3 with (M
end for
7:
for k = c 1 : c 2 do
9:
end for Mode estimator 12:
, δ};
14:
end for 15:
18:
Setĵ k = argmax j µ j k ;
19:
Run Algorithm 4 with (ĵ k ,dĵ
Return:
21:
end for 22: end for w(t) and v k are zero mean Gaussian with covariance matrices Q i (t) = 0.01 2 I, and R i,k = 0.01 4 I. The parameters are adopted from page 598 in [23] : D i = 1, and t ij = 1.5 for ∀i ∈ V. Angular momentums are m i = 10s for i ∈ G and a larger value m i = 100s for load buses i ∈ L. Backstepping inspired stabilizing distributed controllers [19] are applied to the power system. We choose δ = 3.3% as a lower bound of probabilities. The attacker could launch 3 sensor attacks, 3 actuator attacks, and 2 switching attacks described in Figure 3 .
We consider the attack scenario where the system is under the time-varying attacks: sensor attacks 0.01 cos(0.12t) for t = [0, 10), actuator attacks 0.1 − 0.6 sin(0.3t) for t = [10, 20) , and switching attacks for t = [20, 30) . For t ≥ 30, the system would be attack-free.
The goals of case study 1 and 2 are to verify the performance of the NISME for time-varying modes with a regular mode set, and a reduced mode set, respectively. If the sizes of the estimated attack vectors are not statistically significant, mode 0 will be chosen, as described in Algorithm 2. Note that the systems under the new modes satisfy Assumptions 4.1, 5.2, 5.3 and uniform observability condition as well as the rest of the assumptions in Theorem 5.1. True mode estimation is essential because none of the above modes is true.
We conduct the simulation for Algorithm 5, using confidence levels α 1 = α 2 = 0.8 with corresponding z-values z(α 1 ) = z(α 2 ) = 1.28. As case 1, the true modes are among modes 0 to 3, defined in case 1. This is unknown to the defender and the defender remains to consider 256 possible modes in Algorithm 4. For the presentation purpose, we project the modes other than modes 0 to 3 into mode 4; i.e., if mode 4 is chosen, mode estimation is incorrect.
The estimation results are shown in Figure 6 , and 7, which are consistent with the results of the case 1 shown in Figure 4 , and 5. The first subfigure in Figure 6 provides a true mode estimation described in Section 6. As case 1, mode estimates are erroneous near 10 sec because the sizes of attack vectors are small and thus the attack vectors are not regarded statistically significant. After 30 sec, mode probabilities oscillate between two modes in case study 1, but not in case study 2. In case study 1, two modes 1 and 2 are true with zero signal attacks, but mode 3 cannot be a true mode. In case study 2, only mode j 1 is true with zero signal attacks, but modes j 2 , j 3 or j 4 cannot be a true mode.
The modes in the reduced mode set have less restrictive assumptions on attack locations than those of the original mode set, but shows similar estimation results. This simulation, thus, validates the performance of the NISME for the minimal number of modes discussed in Section 6. 
Derivation of the NISE
We derive the NISE in this section. Since each NISE works only for the corresponding fixed mode, we omit the mode index j(t) for notational simplicity. To estimate attack vectors and states, we leverage the discrepancies between outputs z 1,k , z 2,k , and z 3,k defined in (9) , and predicted outputs. We consider linearization error terms (12) in order to establish exact equality, but they would not be considered for the purpose of estimations and covariance updates since they are unknown. As mentioned before, we derive the NISE by approximating that the attack vector estimates are constants during a sampling period. We denotex k|k,p ,x k|k−1,p ,d 1,k,p , andd 2,k,p as estimation errors when the approximation is correct. Additional errors caused by the approximation will be considered in the stability analysis in Section 8.3.
The following lemma guarantees that the derivation steps presented in this section are well defined.
is positive semidefinite, then, for all k ≥ 1, P x k|k−1 is positive semidefinite, and the following matrices induced by the NISE are positive definite:
PROOF. We first prove that P 
, and R 3,k are positive definite. Since the above statement holds for any k ≥ 1, we complete the proof.
Attack vector d 1,k−1 estimation
Since attack vector d 1,k−1 can be directly measured by z 1,k−1 , it can be estimated by, givenx k−1|k−1 ,
where we linearize h 1 , considering linearization error
By normalizing the covariance matrix of the right hand side of (14), we can apply Gauss Markov theorem to find the optimal gain, where best linear unbiased estimate (BLUE) is the linear estimate with smallest variance among all linear and unbiased estimates.
Theorem 8.1 (Gauss Markov Theorem [17] ) Estimatê x = (H * H) −1 H * y is the BLUE for the model y = Hx+v where v is a zero-mean random variable with unit variance and H has full column rank.
The BLUE gain can be obtained through Gauss Markov theorem:
Attack vector d 2,k−1 estimation
Attack vector d 2,k−1 can be estimated using the discrepancy between the predicted output and the measured output
where we linearize functions h 2 and f with considering linearization errors (12) .
2,k is also nonsingular as shown in Lemma 8.1. Estimation error is
State prediction
Since we have the state and attack vector estimates of the previous time instant, we can predict the current state using the dynamiċ
for t ∈ (t k−1 , t k ] with initial conditionx k−1|k−1 to havê x k|k−1 at t = t k . Or equivalently,
where discretization error ρ k−1 is considered to obtain the equivalence of (18) . Its error dynamic is obtained by applying dynamics (10) to x k :
where we linearize f and consider linearization error φ k−1 . The corresponding error covariance matrix is obtained by P
where we apply (15) and (17).
State estimation
We correct the predicted state estimation using the difference between the expected output and measured output z 3,k aŝ (20) and its estimation error is
where we linearize h 3 and consider linearization errors ψ 3,k . Its error covariance matrix is found by
Minimizing the error covariance tr(P x k ) with decision variable L k is an unconstrained optimization problem. To find the BLUE, we take tr(P x k ) derivative and set it equal to zero
is the solution of the unconstrained optimization problem and L k is well defined because P Plugging (15), (17) , and (19) into (21) yields the following update rule for the state estimation errors of the NISE:
whereĀ k−1 andw k−1 are defined in (11),
The priori probability of the mode
The priori probability of the mode is derived and explained in the following section.
Derivation of the mode estimator
It is natural that the predicted output must be matched with the measured output if the mode j is the true mode. For ∀j ∈ M, we quantify the discrepancy between the predicted output and the measured output as follows
We approximate the output error ν j k as a multivariate Gaussian random variable. Then, the likelihood function is given by 
However, such update might allow that some µ j k converge to zero. To prevent this, we modify the posterior probability update to µ
, δ} and δ > 0 is a pre-selected small constant preventing the vanishment of the mode probabilities. The last step is to generate the state, attack vector, and mode estimates of the mode having the maximum posteriori probability.
Stability analysis of the NISE
The piece-wise constant approximation of the attack vector estimates affects the state estimation error update rule; i.e., (22) would be the exact expression only if the approximation is correct. We first obtain the exact relation betweenx k|k andx k−1|k−1 , by analyzing the approximation errors.
Without loss of generality, if Rank(Σ) = 0 in Assumption 5.2, consider constantsc 1 =ḡ 1 =m 1 = 0 for this section. Likewise, if Rank(Σ k ) = 0 for ∀k, consider constantsc 2 = g 2 =ḡ 2 = m 2 =m 2 = r 2 = 0 for this section.
Approximation error analysis
Subscript e is adopted to express the additional error induced by the piece-wise constant approximation; e.g., 
PROOF. We prove bounds for d 1,e (t) and d 2,e (t). Note that d 1,e (t) and d 2,e (t) satisfy d 1,e (t k ) = d 2,e (t k ) = 0 for ∀k after a new estimate is made at the sampling instants. Therefore, we consider their bounds during the one sampling time interval only. Its bound can be found by
where t 1 − t k ≤ is applied to get the desired result. The proof for d 2 (t 2 ) is analogous to that of d 1 (t 1 ). The approximation errors for the attack vector estimates induce additional errors for the state predictions.
We proceed to prove bounds for x e (t). Consider the continuous time state prediction erroṙ
wherex p (t) represents the state prediction error by prediction (18) when the approximation is correct, and x e (t) = 0 if the approximation is correct. Therefore, we consider the bound during the one sampling interval and it holds thaṫ
For t ∈ [t k , t k+1 ], its solution is x e (t) = Its bound can be found by, taking norm both sides,
We can obtain the desired result by applying t k+1 − t ≤ and t − t k ≤ . From the result, we can derive the approximation error for the state estimations x k|k,e .
Consider the state estimation error
where (20) is applied to the third equality. Subtracting x k|k,p in (22) both sides, we have
By taking the norm both sides and apply CauchySchwarz inequality, its upper bound can be found by x k|k,e ≤ (1 +lc 3 )χ.
Proof of Theorem 5.1
We define Lyapunov candidate
Plugging (22) and (24) into the update rule ofx k|k in (23), we obtain
To deal with the above terms, we formalize the proof by several claim statements; i.e., Claim B.1-B.4 deal with the first to fourth terms in (25) , respectively.
Recall that Q k ≤q I, R 1,k ≤r 1 , R 2,k ≤r 2 , R 3,k ≤ r 3 , and ≤¯ for some constantsq ,r 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 , and¯ . We will show that, for any γ ∈ (0, 1), ifq ,r 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 , and¯ are chosen properly, then the state estimation errorsx k|k and attack vector estimation errorsd 1 
Claim B.1: There exists a constant α = (1+
PROOF. Error covariance matrix is updated as
From the upper and lower bounds of matrices, we have
2p ) > 0 and thus it holds that
By applying the matrix inversion lemma [10] , it follows that
which implies the statement with α = (1 +
Claim B.2: There exists a positive constant 0 > 0 such that
PROOF. Noises w k−1 , v 1,k−1 , v 2,k , and v 3,k are uncorrelated and thus we have (R 1,k ) and the similar relations for w k−1 2 , v 2,k 2 , and v 3,k 2 .
Claim B.3: There exist constants δ, δ ρ , λ 1 , 1 > 0 such that, for ∀ x k−1|k−1 ≤ δ and ≤ δ ρ , the following holds:ψ
PROOF. By Assumptions 5.2 and 5.3, it holds that
for all x k−1|k−1 ≤ δ, and ≤ δ ρ . Therefore, we havē
Claim B.4: There exist constants δ, λ 2 , 2 > 0 such that, for ∀ x k−1|k−1 ≤ δ, the following holds:
PROOF. By noting that x e (t k ) ≤χ, we have
for any x k−1|k−1 ≤ δ where 2 p(1 +lc 3 )((1 + lc 3 )(2ā +χ) + 2λ 1 + 2 1 )χ and λ 2 p(1 +lc 3 )(2(1 + lc 3 )ā + 2λ 1 )χ.
By applying Claims B.1-B.4 to (25), we have
for ∀ x k−1|k−1 ≤ δ and ≤ δ ρ where λ λ 1 + λ 2 . Note that λ 1 tends to zero as φ , ψ1 , ψ2 , ψ3 , ρ tend to zero; λ 2 tends to zero as = t k − t k−1 tends to zero. By choosing a sufficiently small tuple ( φ , ψ1 , ψ3 , ρ ,¯ ) such that λδ < α p −1 , we have
for x k−1|k−1 ≤ δ where 0 < α < 1 and c 0 + 1 + 2 . Inequality (26) holds for all ≤¯ . Remind that 0 tends to zero asq ,r 1 ,r 2 andr 3 tend to zero, and constants 1 and 2 tend to zero as tends to zero. Thus, for any given constant c > 0, we can choose sufficiently small tuple (q ,r 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 ,¯ ) such that c < c holds. The following claim shows a PESp-like property for state estimation errors.
Claim B.5: For any γ ∈ (0, 1), there exist positive constants α x , b x , c x , δ and tuple (q ,r 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 ,¯ ) such that, for all x 0|0 ≤ δ, the following holds for all k ≥ 0:
PROOF. Consider any γ ∈ (0, 1) and γ 1 < γ. Then, there exists sufficiently small constant δ < δ and tuple (q ,r 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 ,¯ ) such thatpδ
Since V ≤p x 2 , we have
We choose any x 0|0 ≤ δ. Define the first exit time µ inf{t k > 0| x k|k > δ}, and µ ∧ k min{µ, k} for any k > 0. We have (27) , it follows from (28) that
Letting k → ∞, we also have
Again consider any k with µ ∧ k, and γ 2 = γ − γ 1 . Markov's inequality (p.455 [12] ) derives
Equivalently, P (V µ∧k < α µ∧k V0+ c 1−α γ2 ) ≥ 1 − γ 2 . This implies that, by Minkowski inequality,
where β x ( x 0|0 , µ ∧ k) = p γ2p α (µ∧k)/2 x 0|0 and c x = c (1−α)(pγ2) ). By (29) and (30), we can obtain P ( x k|k < β x ( x 0|0 , k) + c x ) = P ( x k|k < β x ( x 0|0 , k) + c x |µ > k)P (µ > k) + P ( x k|k < β x ( x 0|0 , k) + c x |µ ≤ k)P (µ ≤ k) ≥ P ( x µ∧k|µ∧k < β x ( x 0|0 , µ ∧ k) + c x |µ > k) × P (µ > k) +c 1 cd(δ + (1 +lc 2 )χ) +r 1 Rank(R 1,µ∧k )) + 2d2 .
By Markov's inequality, for t ∈ [t k , t k+1 ), we have
for any γ 3 ∈ (0, 1). Analogous to (31), we have the following for t ∈ [t k , t k+1 )
for some γ ∈ (0, 1). By applying Minkowski inequality to β1( x 0|0 2 ,k)+c1 γ3
, we obtain PESp-like property ford 1 (t).
The proof of PESp-like property ford 2 (t) is similar to that ford 1 (t). We omit its details. Thus, we complete the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5.1
To prove the statement, we first formally establish the equivalence of the NISE and the extended Kalman filter by expressing the attack vector estimates as functions of state estimates. Due to such connection, we apply existing results on the analysis of the extended Kalman filer [8] to the NISE to prove the rest of the part.
By expressingd 1,k−1,p andd 2,k−1,p as functions of x k−1|k−1,p , the state estimation error update of the NISE can be found by (22) . The estimation update rule of (22) is identical to that of the following continuousdiscrete extended Kalman filtering probleṁ x(t) =f (x(t), u(t),w (t), t) z 3,k =h(x k , u k , v k , t k ) (32) where its linearized system is given by
as shown in Claim C.1; i.e., the two problems are equivalent to each other.
Claim C.1: Under Assumption 4.1, state and error covariance update rule of the continuous-discrete extended Kalman filter problem (32) is identical to that described in (22) for the system (4). Moreover, the optimal estimate gains are identical.
PROOF. First consider (32) . State prediction can bė x(t) =f (x(t), u(t), 0, t) for t ∈ (t k−1 , t k ] to havex k|k−1 at t = t k . Or equivalently, x k|k−1 =x k−1|k−1 + f (x k−1|k−1 , u k−1 , 0, t k−1 ) + ρ k−1 . Its error dynamic is given by, linearizing f , x k|k−1,p = (I + Ā k−1 )x k−1|k−1,p +w k−1 +φ k−1 .
State estimate iŝ
x k|k =x k|k−1 + L k (z 3,k −h(x k|k−1 , u k , 0, t k )) with its error dynamic
which is identical to (22) . Once the state update rule (22) is obtained, then error covariance update can be found by the same argument for the NISE. Moreover, it should be emphasized that we need to solve the same unconstrained optimization problem to find the optimal gains L k for the both extended Kalman filer and NISE. Assumption 5.2 implies that Ā k ≤ā, qI ≤Q k and uniform observability of the pair (C 3,k ,Ā k ). The above conditions with Assumptions 5.2, and 5.3 suffice the condition of Theorem 4.5 in [20] (for the extended Kalman filter) which ensures the existence of constants p andp such that pI ≤ P x k = E[x kx T k ] ≤pI for all k ≥ 0. We could apply the existing result because the update rule of the extended Kalman filter is equivalent to the NISE by Claim C.1.
The equivalence to the extended Kalman filter is achieved by the orthogonal output decompositions (8) where their noise vectors are uncorrelated with each others. This leads to the fact that process noisew k−1 and measurement noise v 3,k in (22) are uncorrelated as desired in the extended Kalman filtering problem.
Conclusion
We formulate the attack-resilient estimation of a class of switched nonlinear stochastic systems as the problem of joint estimation of the states, attack vectors and modes. The proposed estimator, the NISME, consists of multiple NISE and a mode estimator. Each NISE is able to generate state and attack estimates for a particular mode and the mode estimator chooses the most likely one. Lastly, the NISME uses the estimates of the selected mode as outputs. We formally analyze the stability of estimation errors in probability for the proposed estimator associated with the true mode under the time-invariant hidden mode. We propose a way to alleviate computational complexity by reducing the number of modes. The estimator performance for time-varying modes with a regular mode set and a reduced mode set is validated by the numerical simulations on the IEEE 68-bus test system.
